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Abstract
The paper defends everyday aesthetics against critiques
inspired by Kant’s distinction between the agreeable and the
beautiful, such as that of Christopher Dowling.  It does this by
focusing on analysis of the concept of the pretty.  Following
Carolyn Korsmeyer and A. C. Bradley, I posit a continuum for
the aesthetic, from the pretty to the beautiful and finally to
the sublime.  After giving a history of the concept of 'pretty,' I
consider its largely gendered nature and the feminist issues
this raises.  I conclude by arguing that limiting aesthetics to
art or to art plus nature ignores the continuity between
everyday life and the arts first emphasized by John Dewey,
and ignores the importance of aesthetic value in the parts of
our lives not devoted to art. 
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My wife, Karen, and I stand in front of our California bungalow
looking at our garden.  Karen says, “The garden looks really
pretty today.”  I say, “Yes.  What are those blue flowers?
 They look nice.”  She:  “Those are irises.  Yes they look nice.” 
Were we talking about aesthetic qualities?  I think so. 
However, 'pretty' is seldom mentioned as an aesthetic quality,
and 'nice' and 'looks nice' are hardly ever.  Note that there
was nothing purely personal or subjective about our
attributions.  Karen expected me to agree with her when she
proclaimed the garden pretty.  I expected her to agree with
me when I said the irises were nice.  We also probably hoped
that at least some others would agree.  Still, we would not be
surprised if some disagreed, too.  There is not only
disagreement but also sometimes argument.  That is, in cases
like this, there is some disputing about taste.  For example, if
we heard that someone thought our garden was ugly, we
would probably say to each other, “What’s wrong with her?
”[1]
1.  Problems with Kant-based criticisms of everyday
aesthetics
What I have said so far should sound both plausible and
natural.  But if so, this shows that Kant’s distinction between
the agreeable and the beautiful is not very useful.  Kant
associates delight in the agreeable with interest in the
existence of the object, the gratification we get from it and, in
its most intense form, the enjoyment.[2]  He further states
that, whereas the agreeable is that which gratifies, the
beautiful is that which “simply pleases.”  The distinction
between gratification and “simply pleases” is not very helpful,
however.  Our word 'gratify' means 'pleases' although it is
often associated with showing gratitude or giving some
award.  Nor is it clear that we are any more interested in the
existence of what we find agreeable than in what we find
beautiful.  
So what is the distinction?  Kant thinks both humans and
animals can experience the agreeable, but only humans can
experience the beautiful.  This is based on the notion that we
humans are distinctly rational and animals are not.  Yet as
contemporary biology has shown, the distinction between
humans and other animals is much more subtle and complex
than that.  Kant further thinks that instead of saying Canary
wine is agreeable we should say it is agreeable to me,
whereas we shouldn’t say that something is beautiful to me. 
Yet when we say a wine is agreeable, we expect others to
value it, as well.  Moreover, we commonly say that something
is “beautiful to me,” and Kant provides no real reasons why we
should stop doing this.  Also, when we say that something is
beautiful, we do not, in opposition to Kant, demand that
everyone agree with us, although we might expect many to
agree.  We put both the agreeable and the beautiful on a
pedestal, although the agreeable probably less so.
Kant says that the judgment of the agreeable is restricted to
me.  It is true that, if I say, “I like this, this is pleasing to me,”
then I am restricting the reference to myself.  But this is not a
judgment.  By contrast, the sentence, “Violin music is
agreeable,” is a judgment and, when I make it, I am not
restricting it to me.  For Kant, when I say that a glass of wine
is good, I wish to simply express a private feeling.  Yet “Violin
music is agreeable,” refers to violin music, which is something
others can hear and which others can judge to be agreeable
or not.  When I say, “Violin music is agreeable,” I expect at
least some people to agree, and if I say “This dog is
beautiful,” I will not be surprised if some disagree.  If we want
to make the claim seem more subjective, we add “to me,” as
in “Well, it looks pretty to me.”  The problem isn’t that there is
no distinction at all, but that the distinction is not clear-cut,
and certainly not as black and white as Kant makes it out to
be.  Recent attacks on everyday aesthetics have assumed a
distinction very similar to Kant’s and, I argue, this is where
they go wrong.
Someone influenced by Kant might say that, although one
person might like garlic and another might not, there is no
disputing about this.  On this view, your hatred of garlic is
purely personal, idiosyncratic, and subjective.  However,
although we may not contest that you hate garlic, we may
contest that you do so on good grounds.  The issue isn’t one of
love and hate but one of whether or not garlic is good.  A
young person might say, “Garlic is disgusting. … It is too
strong,” and someone older might reply, “Well, it is an
acquired taste.”  Although we sometimes let the issue lie, we
don’t always.  Everyday arguments, especially between
parents and children, often go like this:  “Let’s put some garlic
in the salad dressing.”  “No, it’s disgusting.”  “You’re wrong
about that….Try it.  It gives the dressing a certain zing.”  The
claim that garlic is good in salad dressings is not fully
subjective.  To think so is to be hypnotized by Kant into not
recognizing what happens every day.
The problem of the agreeable vs. the beautiful is paralleled by
the problem of distinguishing two kinds of pleasure, aesthetic
and non-aesthetic.  We intuitively feel that there are a lot of
experiences and pleasures that are not aesthetic.  But how do
we know?  We cannot tell simply from the object referred to,
for it is arguable that anything can be experienced
aesthetically when framed in the right way.  Nor can we simply
tell whether something is aesthetic by the words used in
describing it:  there are many terms that can be used either
aesthetically or not.  So what makes a pleasure, an
experience, or a property aesthetic?
Bear in mind that the word 'aesthetic' is hardly a natural kind
word like water.  As with other philosophical terms 'aesthetic'
is, to use W. B. Gallie’s term, “essentially contested.”[3]  Since
the eighteenth century, different philosophers have given
different definitions of 'aesthetic,' and each of these is in
competition with the others.  These definitions have been
intended to satisfy competing overall pictures of diverse but
overlapping sets of phenomena.  The better theories have
succeeded in satisfying a variety of needs, at least for some
people for some time.  However, new definitions are needed to
satisfy new needs.  I find inspiration in Robert Venturi’s
discussion of the definition of architecture.[4]  He claims that
every architect works with a definition of architecture in mind,
that every generation of architects has its own definitions, and
that his firm has a current definition, which he then proceeds
to explicate (i.e. architecture is shelter with symbols on it.) 
Moreover, his definition was powerful, contributing as it did to
the founding of a major movement in architecture
(postmodern architecture).  This is how we should approach
essentially contested concepts.  
Definitions are needed, but no definition is final.  The worse
definitions have been forgotten.  The strongest ones are still
advocated by some, or serve as inspiration for newer
definitions in the same mode.  So, when philosophers like
Christopher Dowling, a recent critic of everyday aesthetics,
worry about “losing the core concept of the aesthetic,” a
natural reply is that there is no core concept, or at least that
there is no absolute and unchanging core concept. [5]  Rather,
with respect to words like 'aesthetic,' we choose to see certain
things as core and others not, and this choice works to some
degree:  it is true or not in the pragmatic sense of 'true.' 
Dowling, for example, chooses critical disagreement (in the
form that we find in art criticism) as the core concept of
aesthetics.  He thinks that art fits that model well, but that
very little in everyday life does.[6]  On this view, the aesthetic
experiences of art are paradigmatic of aesthetic experience in
general, and for an everyday experience to be aesthetic, it
must be significantly art-like.  But why should art be the
center of aesthetics?
Certainly the most paradigmatic aesthetic term, 'beautiful,' can
be applied to a range of objects that goes well beyond art. 
We have beautiful friendships, football passes, springs, babies,
outfits, and meals just as much as beautiful works of art.  It is
plausible that whenever we experience something as beautiful
we have an aesthetic experience.  There are many other
aesthetic terms, such as 'pretty,' 'graceful,' and 'elegant,' all of
which refer to aesthetic qualities.  So it is also plausible that
whenever we experience something as having an aesthetic
quality, we are having an aesthetic experience, and that
whenever we have such an experience with pleasure we are
having an aesthetic pleasure.  If an experience of something
as beautiful, graceful, elegant, or pretty, is an aesthetic
experience then aesthetic experience extends well beyond the
domain of art and there are many things that have aesthetic
properties that are not art.
It is not clear why critical disagreement is so central to
Dowling’s understanding of the aesthetic.  Surely one can have
an aesthetic experience without it.  For example, one can walk
into a museum and look at a painting and experience it
aesthetically without paying any attention to the critical
discussions that traditionally might have surrounded it. 
Perhaps he means that something is aesthetic if one could
disagree critically about it.  On this view, one could have
critical disagreement about a Rembrandt but not about a
scoop of chocolate ice cream.  But why insist that everyday
matters lack critical disagreement?  Kevin Melchionne, in his
otherwise critical response to Dowling, concedes that “our
cooking, wardrobe choices, and décor are rarely the subject of
argument and intersubjective engagement.”[7]  Yet I wonder
whether he hasn’t conceded too much here.  What about all
those arguments I have with my wife about cooking, wardrobe
choices, and décor (for example, whether or not a table we
found at a second-hand store would look good in our living
room)?  Do they not count as critical disagreement? 
Perhaps Dowling wishes to exclude this kind of conversation
and only include discussions that occur within a community of
connoisseurs.  Yet is it wrong to use the word 'beautiful' if
there is no community of connoisseurs, or for someone to use
it outside that community?  We certainly do not want to hold
that only a good judge in Hume’s sense can actually gain
aesthetic pleasure from something.  Children who have no
expertise can still see something as beautiful in a way that is
not purely subjective.
Maybe all Dowling is saying is that works of art are subject to
critical reviews in newspapers and art journals and that we do
not see similar reviews of everyday aesthetic phenomena.  It
is true that such phenomena are seldom reviewed in this way. 
Yet we do see reviews of designers and design trends.  For
example, Adolf Loos argued that ornament is crime and that
therefore we should reject the work of the Vienna Secession
designers.[8]  Moreover, individual products are reviewed in
consumer guides and by customers on-line.  Also, everyday
aesthetic choices can be a source of great debate in non-
institutional contexts, as witnessed in cross-generational
disagreements over body-piercings.
One plausible theory about what distinguishes aesthetic from
non-aesthetic pleasure is contextual meaning.  On this view,
what makes scratching an itch aesthetic and not just a
sensuous pleasure is having contextual meaning.[9]  An
alternative approach is offered by Kant.  His idea is that
aesthetic pleasures come when judgment is disinterested and
based on reflective contemplation.  
Dowling invokes Kant with his notion of the essential quality of
critical discourse.  I do not think critical discourse is required,
but perhaps contemplative judgment is, although whether the
judgment needs to be explicit or conscious is another matter. 
Yet if judgment is simply a matter of applying a predicate,
then saying that something (for example, a car or a dress) is
pretty or nice is as much a judgment as saying that it is
beautiful.  So does the contemplation condition exclude this
kind of judgment?  Contemplation does attend many aesthetic
experiences.  However, if contemplation were required for
judgments of beauty (or of prettiness, for that matter) then
there could never be ones that came all at once.  Yet this
clearly happens, as when we suddenly perceive a stunning
landscape or a pretty lane.  Perhaps one can only say that
judgments of beauty are more often (or much more often) the
result of contemplation than judgments of prettiness. 
However, this does not make the latter non-aesthetic.
A final way to understand Dowling’s criticism is to say that
critical communication is communication in which there are
norms.  The complaint may be that whereas the aesthetics of
art has norms, and the aesthetics of nature is quickly gaining
norms (for example through the work of scientific cognitivists),
the aesthetics of everyday life has none.  Carlson and Parson’s
book Functional Beauty could be seen as one way to make the
aesthetics of everyday life, or at least some parts of it,
normative.[10]  Functional objects, they argue, cannot look
beautiful or have other aesthetically positive qualities if they
do not look fit for their function. Yuriko Saito also brings in a
normative dimension when she argues that green lawns are
unattractive because they are bad for the environment.[11] 
Nor is the normative limited to these kinds of cases if we allow
for norms that are not universal, ones that are perhaps
accepted only by a narrow community and that may not be
explicitly stated.   
The question is whether there can be norms for judgments like
“this is agreeable” or “this is pretty.”  One can have standards
of prettiness just as one has standards of beauty.  One can
believe that certain things attempt to be pretty and fail.  There
can even be competing constituencies, one group believing a
class of things is pretty (say a type of decorative garden)
whereas others see it as horrible kitsch.  This repeats debates
that appear at the level of beauty, one group seeing the work
of Bouguereau as beautiful, another as kitsch.  And even when
everyday aesthetics appears to lack norms, as when someone
appreciates the play of shadows on a wall, this does not imply
that they have none.  Having norms in this case is simply a
matter of being able to give plausible reasons for why one
appreciates these things.
However, maybe neither contextual meaning, nor reflective
contemplation, nor norms is necessary for an aesthetic
experience.  Perhaps all that is needed to distinguish aesthetic
from non-aesthetic pleasure is some form of complexity,
richness, or depth.  On this view, contextual meaning,
reflective contemplation and application of norms are only
ways of providing the requisite complexity.  The pleasure of a
warm bath by itself would not be aesthetic, but if, as Sheri
Irvin suggests, the pleasure is richly evocative or seems to
sum up all that is good in life, we could then say that it
is.[12]  So the question with respect to 'pretty' and similar
terms is whether the qualities they refer to are not complex or
rich enough (in particular uses) to warrant being called
aesthetic.  I cannot go into this here, but have argued
elsewhere that they must have an aura of heightened
significance.[13]  On this view, 'pretty' and similar terms can
be aesthetic qualities, although they are not always. 
Moreover, they are often used aesthetically.  When they are,
they refer to an experience that includes an aura of
heightened significance but at a lower intensity than found in
the beautiful, and a much lower level than found in the
sublime. 
Dowling insists that an aesthetic claim is either trivial or
universally valid.  This is a false dichotomy.  Nothing is trivial
in every respect and in every light, and nothing is universal in
every respect and in every light …. at least not in aesthetics. 
At the very least there is a continuum between the ultimately
trivial and the ultimately universal.  Most things are in-
between.  The worry here is that calling everyday experiences
aesthetic trivializes grand aesthetic experience.  There is no
doubt that the experience of a Rembrandt can be much richer
and more complex than that of a lovely front yard.
 Nonetheless, it still makes sense to say that they are both
aesthetic. 
A final worry is that philosophers will take aesthetics less
seriously if it includes the pretty and the nice.  Do
philosophers take morality less seriously when it deals with
the question of stealing an apple from a neighbor’s tree as well
as with questions surrounding torture or murder?  Isn’t it,
rather, a sign of seriousness that one deals with the minor as
well as the major issues in a field?  It is arguable that once the
intimate connections between aesthetic and other pleasures is
made clear, once aesthetics is no longer isolated in the realm
of fine art or art plus nature, it will be taken more seriously by
philosophers who had previously neglected it. 
2.  Pretty
I mention above that the pretty is seldom discussed in
aesthetics.  I want to stress the strangeness of that here. 
'Pretty' appears in the indexes of no encyclopedias,
companions, guidebooks, or textbooks of aesthetics I know
of.[14]  There are no articles devoted to it and this is, as far
as I know, the first to discuss it at length.  This makes it in
stark contrast to the beautiful and the sublime.  Why is this?
The English word 'pretty' goes back to Old English for tricky or
crafty.  It later came to mean clever or artful.  In Middle
English it referred to a person who is excellent or admirable in
appearance or manners.  It is not until the mid-sixteenth
century that it came to mean a thing that is fine, pleasing,
nice, agreeable or proper.  At this time it also came to refer to
a person (especially a woman or child) that is attractive and
pleasing in appearance, or beautiful in a delicate way.[15] 
This continues to be its main meaning, although it has other
uses.
However, it is worthwhile to take the history of the concept
back before the English word.  It could be argued that Plato
was opposed to the pretty as he spoke against cosmetics in
the Gorgias and makes fun of Hippias’ superficial notion of
beauty in the Greater Hippias as well as Ion’s in the Ion. [16] 
For Plato, cosmetics is a mere knack, the purpose of which is
to produce gratification or pleasure.  It is contrasted to
gymnastics, which he considers a true art and productive of
the good.  Perhaps Plato was not entirely opposed to the
pretty, since he commonly refers to pretty girls or boys
without disapproval.  Nonetheless, he certainly thought that
the beautiful was far more important.  In the Symposium he
portrays Diotima putting forth a theory of beauty in which the
lover of beauty goes up steps in a ladder of love.  The first
step, in which the lover enjoys the beauty of a boy, can be
said to exist at the level of the pretty.  In the final stage,
apprehension of Beauty itself can be seen as taking a position
similar to the level of the sublime in eighteenth century
aesthetics, although it does not have the fearful properties
associated with that concept.  Plato’s image of beauty as a
continuum between the pretty and Beauty itself contains an
important insight that was picked up again by A. C. Bradley
and Carolyn Korsmeyer and will be adapted in this paper.
Moving to the Enlightenment era, we find that most
philosophers only discussed prettiness in order to distinguish it
from beauty, usually (in line with Plato) to the detriment of
the former.  In the seventeenth century, Dominique Bouhours
said that “We sometimes call a thought beautiful which is in
fact only pretty (joli), thus confusing beauty with that which
we find pleasing.”[17]  This is similar to Kant’s later distinction
between the agreeable and the beautiful discussed above. 
Although eighteenth century British aestheticians seldom
mention the pretty, Edmund Burke’s treatment of beauty in
terms of what is small, delicate, curved, and contained, reads
very much like a discussion of the pretty.[18]  As Santayana
wrote, “By beautiful [Burke] means pretty and charming;
agreeable as opposed to impressive.” Santayana thought that
by doing so, Burke only exaggerated the opposition between
the beautiful and the sublime.[19]  By making room for the
pretty Santayana opened a path towards everyday aesthetics.
Gender issues concerning the pretty rose to importance in the
eighteenth century.  Kant, in his early Observations on the
Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime made a distinction
between a woman who is pretty and one who is beautiful, the
former providing only non-moral pleasantness.[20]  Mary
Wollstonecraft contrasted “a pretty woman, as an object of
desire” with “a fine woman who inspires more sublime
emotions by displaying intellectual beauty.”[21]  She wanted
to direct men away from the “sensual homage paid to
beauty…of features” which is associated with the pretty.
Gender differences were also found in taste itself.  Carolyn
Korsmeyer has observed that the eighteenth century saw
feminine taste as being for the pretty and charming, while
masculine taste was for the profound and difficult.[22]  This
division of expected taste was extended to a division of the
arts.  Flower painting in the eighteenth century was
characterized as pretty and was associated with women.[23] 
Whether prettiness is politically suspect is a common
contemporary theme as well, with second-wave feminists
attacking it as masculinist and some self-described third-wave
feminists giving it new value as an affirmation of
femininity.[24] 
The early twentieth century saw further developments of the
concept of 'pretty' in the work of A. C. Bradley and Clive Bell. 
Bradley, writing in 1909, distinguished between two senses of
the word 'beauty:'  the one more general, in which Philosophy
of Beauty and Aesthetics are equivalent, and the other more
specific.[25]  The more specific meaning allows us to say that
something is pretty but not beautiful.  He then places five
“modes of beauty” side by side.  These are, in sequence: 
sublime, grand, “beautiful” (in the more specific sense),
graceful, and pretty.  He notes that the first two seem allied,
as do the last two, while beauty holds a neutral position, or
inclines more to grace.  Sublime and pretty, in this scheme,
are “the most widely removed.”
Bell was a leading denigrator of the pretty, both as subject
matter and as an aesthetic quality within art.  In his criticism
of 'beautiful' as an aesthetic term, he describes the philistine
as someone who believes that “[a] beautiful picture is a
photograph of a pretty girl…”[26]  He says of Frith’s
Paddington Station that, although the “picture contains several
pretty passages of color, and is by no means badly painted,” it
is not a work of art because it is merely descriptive.  Later in
the historical section of his book Art, Bell criticized officials of
the Byzantine Empire for choosing pretty patterns over
significant design, thirteenth century Gothic buildings for being
“stuck all over” with pretty things,[27] and eighteenth century
artists for being happy to copy whatever is pretty.[28]  He
complained that by the mid-nineteenth century “art” had come
to mean the imitation of objects, “preferably pretty or
interesting ones.”[29]  He even criticized some art of his own
time for juxtaposing pretty patches of color without
considering formal relations.
In the mid-twentieth century Frank Sibley included pretty as
one of his aesthetic concepts (along with beautiful, dainty and
graceful), seeing it, along with lovely, as a term that people
with only moderate aesthetic ability can use.[30]  Such terms
are different from ones which can be used only by those few
who can make more subtle distinctions.[31]  Francis Sparshott
thought of the pretty as applicable to feminine things and pets,
and saw it as part of a trio that also includes the sublime and
the beautiful. [32]  He gave a kitty and a thatched house as
examples of things that are pretty.  The pretty on his view is
what does not demand serious attention, arouses stock
responses, and is trivial.
3.  The Continuum
I turn now to a recent approach to the pretty which, rather
than simply being negative, situates it in a continuum with
beauty.[33]  In her article, “Terrible Beauties,” which
explicates the concept of difficult beauty, Carolyn Korsmeyer
observed that “[i]n certain respects pretty and beautiful can
be considered points on a continuum of aesthetically pleasing
appearance,” and that “considering what goes into assigning
an object (or a face or body) its place on this continuum
illuminates something of the role of the difficult in the
formation of beauty.”[34]  Further, when discussing a passage
from Matisse on his creative process, Korsmeyer captured
something of the dynamic nature of this continuum, how
something can exist at one level and yet be moved to another.
 When Matisse deepened appreciation of his lines and shapes
by making them less immediately pleasant, he illuminated a
transition between what is merely pretty and what may
perhaps be called beautiful, a transition that requires making
appreciation more strenuous and less seductive.[35]  So we
can speak of the beautiful emerging out of the pretty by way
of what she calls “intensification of experience.”[36]  This can
happen, for example, by taking on “implicit moral or existential
weight.”[37] In short, the sweet, the pretty, and the charming
move towards the beautiful, not only in art but in everyday life
(as in appreciation of faces) as they become more difficult.
The idea of a continuum (in this case a developmental one)
can also be found in the work of the early environmentalist
philosopher Aldo Leopold when he says, “[o]ur ability to
perceive quality in nature begins, as in art, with the pretty.  It
expands through successive stages of the beautiful to values
as yet uncaptured by language.” [38]
Korsmeyer refers to prettiness as a less important value than
beauty.[39]  Here I disagree somewhat.  In a way she is right,
for the pretty is lower on the hierarchy of beauty, is the focus
of less thought, and gives experiences that are less rich. 
However, it is also more pervasive, and plays a quantitatively
larger role in our lives.  It is rare to find something beautiful or
to have an experience of beauty, but seeing things as pretty,
cute, or nice is an everyday experience.  This is also true for
the aesthetic negatives:  true ugliness is rare, but dull,
unpleasant, and plain things are common.  This pervasiveness
makes for something that is immensely important. 
4. Some preliminary issues
I am arguing that everyday aesthetics extends beyond the
narrow domain Dowling wishes to limit it to, and I am using
the importance of the pretty (as holding its own place in the
continuum of aesthetics) to show this.  However, I do not
intend to praise or promote prettiness in the sense of getting
people to care more about pretty things.  I am not opposed to
promoting more aesthetic experience in everyday life, but I
suspect that people notice prettiness and pretty things as
much as they need to.  Nor would I like to promote
appreciation of the pretty over appreciation of difficult
beauties.  People need no encouragement or training to
appreciate things as pretty, but they need both to appreciate
difficult beauties.  However, with Robert Solomon, I think
there is nothing wrong with enjoying the sweet sentiments, of
which pleasure in the pretty is one, as long as no one is
harmed.[40] 
Nor do I believe promoting experiences of the pretty would
entail promoting the arts.  It is arguable that in order to do
serious art, or maybe even art at all, one has to combat the
seductions of the pretty.  It is not for nothing that there have
been so many attacks on the pretty.  Prettiness is notoriously
superficial.  It often masks human suffering with an illusion of
pleasantness.  Nietzsche sometimes treated the Apollonian
artist as promoting this way of looking at the world.[41]  No
wonder he referred to such artists as naïve.  I agree that great
art requires overcoming the seductiveness of superficial
pleasures.  The pretty can play a role in art, but only as part
of a more complex structure of experience.  Art cannot ignore
the pretty any more than it can ignore the cute, the
entertaining, or the pleasing.  However, in attending to the
pretty, it must dig beneath the surface.  Art, moreover, has to
combat the philistine who thinks that art only has to do with
pretty things.  The philistine reduces art to beauty, reduces
beauty to the pretty, despises the pretty, and so rejects
beauty and then art.  The answer to the philistine is not to
banish the pretty from aesthetics but to block the reductions.
To say a work of art is pretty is generally a put-down, at least
in the fine arts.  However, the concept does have a role in fine
art, for example in referring to a pretty passage in paint or
music, or when art references the pretty, as in some feminist
and gay art.  It is even quite commonly taken to be a positive
aesthetic quality in the decorative arts.  On Antiques
Roadshow I have seen an expert refer to an eighteenth
century French porcelain vase as “very prettily painted.”  This
was obviously considered to be a compliment.
5.  Feminist objections
As we saw in the historical section, the pretty is a heavily
gendered concept.  It is not only more frequently applied to
females; it is also more frequently applied to things in what is
traditionally considered the female realm, for example to
children, kitchenware, rooms and dresses.  Of course it is also
an evolving concept.  Part of what is involved in its ongoing
evolution is changing attitudes concerning women’s rights and,
more generally, what it is to be a woman.
Some feminists may criticize the aesthetics of everyday life for
discussing the concept of the pretty.  Yet discussing a concept
is not the same as promoting its current uses.  Moreover, the
aesthetics of everyday life has close affinities with feminist
aesthetics. The aesthetics of everyday life has only recently
emerged within the discipline of philosophical aesthetics, and
this may be largely because it often deals with aspects of life
associated with females. 
The concept of the pretty seems innocuous.  It is pleasant,
after all, to experience a garden, house, or girl as pretty.  And
it doesn’t actually hurt anyone, except when you say that the
garden, house, or girl is merely pretty.  There are, however,
situations in which being called pretty may be problematic. 
Two examples are (1) a heterosexual male may take offence
to being called pretty, and (2) a woman might take offence if
she is referred to as pretty in a professional context where
reference to her looks would be inappropriate.  Feminist critics
are right to suggest that attributions of prettiness to women
should be approached with caution, at least in such contexts.
 Even so, this worry need not extend to all attributions of
prettiness, for example to streams or mountains.  (It is hard
to see how saying that a stream is pretty contributes to the
oppression of women, for example.)  To throw out the concept
of 'pretty' because of feminist issues might be to lose some
very valuable uses.
Still, it might be argued that these gender problems extend
beyond application of the term to women, maybe not in the
case of streams and mountains, but in how we see such things
as pots and ties.  There are certainly differences in the ways
we speak.  A man might be more hesitant to call a pot pretty,
although he might accede to its being graceful or elegant.  A
woman might say a man’s tie is pretty, but none of his male
friends would.  It might, then, be argued that we should
suspect the very concept of the pretty because women are not
only seen as its objects (in a way that makes men take them
less seriously) but also are expected to find things pretty more
often or in different circumstances than men.  The thought
here is that many uses of the concept are infected by those
uses that directly take agency away from women.
However, as we analyze the pretty we should not just reflect
on current usage but participate in forward-thinking changes. 
As pro-feminists, we want the future to be egalitarian.  Such a
future would be one in which the pretty is not as gender-
weighted as it is today, at least not in such a way as to harm
women.  We want a future in which the concept is not used to
make women less free.  In short, the attachment between the
pretty and the oppression of women might be historical and
contingent:  the word could evolve in a way that is consistent
with egalitarianism without losing its ability to tie down the
lower end of the aesthetics continuum.   
6.  A problem with the continuum hypothesis
It is admittedly difficult to place individual aesthetic terms on a
continuum.  For one thing, terms take on different meanings in
different contexts.  Aesthetic terms may be used for all sorts of
purposes, and even 'pretty' could be used as a term of praise
in a fine art context (as when an eccentric teacher uses it as
his or her highest form of praise).  Another problem with the
continuum hypothesis is whether we can find a way to
distinguish between the lowest level of the continuum and that
which falls below that level.  I have already suggested that
some sort of richness, some aura of heightened significance is
needed, and that this may be achieved through
contemplation.  However, contemplation may not be required
since many of our experiences of something as pretty are
immediate.  I see some mountains lighted by the morning sun
through an airplane window and say to my travel companion
“look at those mountains, aren’t they pretty.”  On my view an
aura of heightened significance is both necessary and
sufficient for something to be aesthetic.  In any case, my
motive in bringing in the continuum hypothesis was not to set
up a stable and exact hierarchy of aesthetic terms but rather
to deconstruct a strict dividing line between the purely
subjective realm of the agreeable and the objective realm of
critical discourse, a distinction that is often used by those who
would attack everyday aesthetics from a Kantian angle.
7.  Conclusion
'Pretty,' 'nice' and similar terms are often used to refer to
aesthetic qualities.  However, often, at least for 'pretty' in the
fine arts, the quality is negative.  We have to turn to everyday
aesthetics (and perhaps to the popular arts) to find 'pretty'
and 'nice' used in a generally positive way, for example in
referring to a pretty (or nice) house, dress, garden, girl, boy,
thought, card, table-setting, plant, flower, walk, photograph,
song, dance, town, baby, or voice.
Following Bradley, Korsmeyer, and ultimately Plato, I argued
that pretty and nice are at the low end of a continuum that
constitutes beauty in its most general sense.  The continuum
situates 'beauty' in the narrow sense of the term in the middle
and 'sublime' at the high end.  Kant’s concept of the agreeable
is not helpful here since he failed to recognize that as soon as
we find something agreeable we have judged it, thus taking it
out of the realm of merely sensuous pleasure.  He confuses
what is merely felt as agreeable or liked with what is called
agreeable, likable, pleasant or pretty.  These concepts are
aesthetic every bit as much as beautiful and sublime.  Kant’s
concept of 'the agreeable' covers whatever we like without
making a judgment and without a contemplative or reflective
dimension to that liking.  So it is not to be dismissed. 
However, as soon as we say that something is agreeable or
even likeable we are making a statement about something
outside of ourselves, are making assumptions about what
others will value, and are raising the experience to the level of
beauty (in the general sense of that term), hence to
aesthetics.  The object then obtains a low-level aura of
significance.  So when we say that something is pretty, we are
making a kind of aesthetic claim, and this frees everyday
aesthetics from the kinds of objections raised by Dowling and
others influenced by Kant.
Aesthetics is a vast sea, and the aesthetics of fine art is a little
island in that sea.  Limiting aesthetics to art or to art plus
nature has various disadvantages.  It ignores the continuity
between everyday life and the arts first emphasized by John
Dewey[42] and more recently promoted by everyday
aestheticians and aestheticians inspired by evolutionary
theory.  It ignores the importance of aesthetic value in the
parts of our lives not devoted to art.  It fails to recognize the
dynamic relation between art and everyday life.  Moreover,
recognizing the importance of such qualities as "pretty" and
"nice" in no way trivializes or diminishes the importance of
such qualities as "beautiful" or "sublime" or such things as art
and nature. 
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